Reach out and Tax Someone: I.R.C. Section 4252(b)(1) and the Disappearance of Taxable Long-Distance Service by Leeper, Kurt A.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 3
2005
Reach out and Tax Someone: I.R.C. Section
4252(b)(1) and the Disappearance of Taxable
Long-Distance Service
Kurt A. Leeper
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kurt A. Leeper, Reach out and Tax Someone: I.R.C. Section 4252(b)(1) and the Disappearance of Taxable Long-Distance Service, 55 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 733 (2005)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol55/iss3/17
REACH OUT AND TAX SOMEONE:
I.R.C. SECTION 4252(b)(1) AND THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF TAXABLE LONG-
DISTANCE SERVICE
"The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that
would operate with perfect equality."
-Andrew Jackson'
The Internal Revenue Code is not immune to changes in the world
around it, and on occasion technology or some other machination will
wrench an otherwise taxable event from the grasp of the Code's lan-
guage. In the case of Code sections 4251 and 4252(b)(1) and the tax
they impose on long-distance services, this is exactly what has hap-
pened. The change in the nature of the services the provisions were
intended to tax, and more importantly the disparate results in the pro-
visions' application subsequent to the change, is the focus of this
Comment.
Most people would agree that an ideal tax system would be fair to
all of those on whom it imposed the responsibility to pay. However,
as Andrew Jackson suggested, such a system has been historically
elusive, and the years since his statement have provided nothing to
discredit that notion. Even assuming that Congress could contrive a
perfectly equitable taxation scheme, that scheme would be perfectly
equitable only at its moment of creation. Because the world in which
the Internal Revenue Code operates constantly changes while the
Code itself changes only when Congress sees fit to do so, the mere
passage of time may create inequitable results unintended by the
Code's original drafters.
In the past decade, this is precisely what has happened with a cou-
ple of sleepy sections of the Code, sections 4251 and 4252, as techno-
logical progress has moved the commercial activity taxed by the pro-
'Andrew Jackson, Proclamation to the People of South Carolina, Dec. 10, 1832, available
at http://www.multied.com/documents/MessagesC.html.
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visions beyond the original language of those sections. Specifically,
the provisions tax certain long-distance telephone services and de-
lineate their scope by carefully defining what constitutes such a ser-
vice; a key component of this definition is the method by which tax-
able services are billed. Recent changes in the billing methods em-
ployed by long-distance companies, however, have opened the door
for formerly taxable long-distance services to elude the grasp of the
Code's language. As such, read literally, the provisions no longer
apply to the services which they were intended to tax.
A few enterprising companies have taken note of this change and
have attempted to use it to their advantage with varying results.
These businesses have filed for refunds on taxes paid under the provi-
sions and have based their cases on the inapplicability of the provi-
sions' language to modem billing methods. While only a handful of
such cases have so far been tried, inconsistencies have already arisen
in outcomes: one plaintiff was denied a refund, while three others
enjoyed more favorable results.
Each case turned on whether the respective court found section
4252(b)(1)'s definition of a taxable long-distance service to be am-
biguous in its language, thus allowing the court to look beyond the
language to the presumable congressional intent to tax everything in
sight. If no ambiguity existed, the result was clear-cut, as the lan-
guage of the statute unquestionably does not apply to modem billing
methods. Courts that adopted this view held for the taxpaying plain-
tiff, while the single court finding for the government embarked on a
twisting analysis to justify its finding of purported statutory ambigui-
ties.
These cases, while small in number, have potentially far-reaching
consequences. The first problem (one that is suggested by Andrew
Jackson's observation) is inconsistency in application: in factually
indistinguishable situations, some taxpayers have been able to avoid
taxation while at least one has not. Likewise, the amounts of money
involved are not insubstantial, as frequently the refunds sought in-
volve hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the potential for multi-
million dollar refunds may arise as more businesses join the fray.2
Although some inconsistency is perhaps the inevitable result of mul-
tiple trial courts addressing the same issue (with appellate courts yet
to weigh in), as the stakes grow it becomes increasingly clear that it is
2 See Warren Rojas, Phone Tax Fix Could Put Refund Suits on Hold, 106 TAX NOTES
412, 412 (2005) (noting that, as of January 2005, courts had sided with taxpaying plaintiffs in
cases involving approximately $1.25 million in taxes).
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patently unfair to require one business to pay large sums of money to
the IRS while another escapes taxation on the exact same services.
As such, given that the language of the relevant provisions is clear
to all but the most meddling court, Congress must either do away with
these provisions altogether or amend them to reflect modem technol-
ogy. Until this happens, the potential for litigation and inequitable
application will only increase as businesses realize the potential tax
savings involved. To illustrate the need for change, this Comment
will, in Part I, consider the provisions themselves, the context in
which they were enacted and then amended to their current form, and
the changes in billing methods that have created the current problem.
Then, by considering two key cases and courts' rationales, Part II will
attempt to illustrate the logic behind courts' disparate conclusions and
the potential consequences involved. Finally, Part 1 will reiterate
the need for congressional intervention.
I. SECTIONS 4251 AND 4252 AND THEIR HISTORY
The deceptively simple sources of these problems are sections
4251 and 4252(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 4251
imposes a three percent excise tax on fees paid for "communication
services," including "toll telephone services." 3 To clarify the scope of
section 4251, section 4252(b)(1) in turn defines "toll telephone ser-
vice" to include a "telephonic quality communication for which (A)
there is a toll charge which varies in amount with the distance and
elapsed transmission time of each individual communication and (B)
the charge is paid within the United States."4
Originally, the provisions were enacted as emergency revenue-
raising measures during the Great Depression, World War II, and the
Korean War.5 By 1965, however, Congress had apparently grown
weary of these and related excise taxes. The result was the Excise
Tax Reduction Act of 1965,6 the aim of which was to reduce and re-
strict the application of these taxes.7 Congress lamented the fact that
3 I.R.C. § 4251 (2004).
4 I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) (2004). The section also includes as a "toll telephone service" "a
service which entitles the subscriber, upon payment of a periodic charge (determined as a flat
amount or upon the basis of total elapsed transmission time) to the privilege of an unlimited
number of telephonic communications to or from all or a substantial portion of the persons
having telephone or radio telephone stations in a specified area which is outside the local tele-
phone system area in which the station provided with this service is located." Id. This portion of
the section, however, is not the focus of the issue at hand.
5 See H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645 (noting that the
1965 amendments were a "comprehensive overhaul" of these and other taxes levied during the
earlier periods).
6 Pub. L. No. 89-44, 79 Stat. 136 (1965).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645.
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the long-distance tax imposed was not developed on any systematicbasis and indeed was often discriminatory in its application, evengoing so far as to label the tax an "undesirable 
... permanent feature
of our excise tax system.'8 Because it fell more heavily on those withlower incomes, the tax therefore was to be phased out over the nexthalf-decade. 9 Obviously, this was not to be its fate.In addition to (supposedly) phasing out the tax, Congress at-tempted to clarify which services were subject to the provisions.Specifically, when the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 changedsection 4252(b)(1)'s definition of "toll telephone service" to its cur-rent form,'0 the then-new definition reflected and largely encom-passed the billing methods used by AT&T, the primary provider oflong-distance service at the time." While the amended language ren-dered most long-distance service taxable for many years after thechange, in the past decade traditional long-distance service providershave largely abandoned using distance (and sometimes even time) asa factor in charging for such services. As a result, a call across thestreet is now often billed at the same rate as a call across the coun-
try.1
2
Even after this recent change in billing methods took place, thereexisted little evidence that a potentially major taxation issue was im-minent. Within the span of one month in early 2004, however, twocourts reached opposing conclusions in considering whether the lan-guage of section 4 252(b)(1)'s definition of "toll telephone service"could impose a tax under modem long-distance billing systems.These cases, Office Max, Inc. v. United States13 and American Bank-ers Insurance Group, Inc. v. United States,14 along with a handful of
8 H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1676.9 Id.
10 See Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 302, 79 Stat. 136, 146(1965) (amending the statute to reflect its current form). The overall purpose of the act was toreduce and restrict the application of federal excise taxes. H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), re-printed in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645.See Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (S.D.Fla. 2004) (describing the state of long-distance service at the time of amendment).12 See Nicholas Thompson, Phone Companies See Their Future in Flat-Rate Plans ofMany Services, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at Cl (citing competition from wireless carriers,which often offer flat-rate nationwide calling, as one reason for the change).13 309 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 2004).14 308 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Immediately prior to publication, the EleventhCircuit Court of Appeals reversed this case, finding the word "and" to be unambiguous. SeeAm. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8132 (11th Cir. May 10,2005). Nevertheless, the district court's decision stands as a testament both to the legal wran-gling these issues may cause and to the need for clarification of the relevant provisions of theInternal Revenue Code.
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subsequent decisions, have begun what is rapidly becoming a conten-
tious and potentially expensive battle over taxes.
I. THE PRIMARY CASES CONSIDERING SECTIONS 4251 AND
4252(B)(1)
The relevant facts are essentially the same in the cases addressing
sections 4251 and 4252(b)(1). In each, the plaintiff business paid
taxes under the provisions for "toll telephone service" to its long-
distance service provider; the provider in turn remitted those sums to
the Internal Revenue Service. Each business filed a claim for a re-
fund for the amount of taxes paid, claiming that the amounts surren-
dered to pay for long-distance service did not vary with distance and
thus were not paid for "toll telephone services" taxable under sections
4251 and 4252(b)(1). The Service refused each request, prompting
lawsuits from the taxpaying businesses.
A. American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. v. United States:
Modem Long-Distance Services are Taxable
In January 2004, the first case addressing the applicability of sec-
tions 4251 and 4252 to modern long-distance billing methods ap-
peared. In American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. v. United States,
the taxpayer sought a refund of over $360,000 for three and one-half
years' worth of taxes paid under the statute. 15 In support of its argu-
ment that it had not purchased a taxable "toll telephone service," the
American Bankers Insurance Group (hereinafter "ABIG") pointed out
that it had not paid fees based on both time and distance. Instead, it
had paid a flat rate (i.e., a distance-independent rate that varied only
with the time of the call) for all interstate and most intrastate calls
within the United States. For international calls, ABIG paid a rate
that varied depending only on the length of a call and the country to
which the call was placed. 16 As such, ABIG argued, it had not pur-
chased a taxable "toll telephone service" under section 4252(b)( 1).17
The trial court in the Southern District of Florida, however, dis-
agreed, and first identified situations in which it could look beyond a
statute's language to consider congressional intent. Both ambiguity
in the statutory language and evidence of legislative intent contrary to
a plain meaning reading would suffice to prompt such analysis.'8 In
this instance, the court found both situations were present.
15 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1362.
18 Id. at 1363-64.
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First, the court eschewed the traditional notions that the words
"and" and "or" mean two very different things and, especially in deal-
ing with the Code, that the words thus must be taken literally.' 9 Ac-
cording to the court, section 4252(b)(1) was ambiguous because the
word "and" in the phrase "distance and elapsed transmission time"
could be read disjunctively to actually mean "or.",20 In support of its
finding, the court cited the dictionary definition of "and," which states
that the word may mean "or," especially when used in legal lan-
guage.2 1  The court found further ambiguity by looking to section
4252(b)(1)'s definition of "toll telephone service" itself as well as
other portions of the statute and found that Congress could have been
using "and" in either its usual sense or alternatively to mean "or.,
22
Either way, in the court's view, this evidence sufficed to allow an
examination of legislative intent beyond the statutory language it-
self.2
3
In addition to statutory ambiguity, the court found that evidence of
legislative intent contrary to the statute's apparent plain meaning pro-
vided grounds on which it could look beyond the language of section
4252(b)(1). After examining the legislative history, the court deter-
mined that the intent of the section was to tax almost all commercial
long-distance service.24 The court noted that, at the time of the 1965
amendment, the AT&T monopoly offered only two options for billing
long-distance service. 25 The 1965 amendment appeared to be an ef-
fort to describe both of these options and, the court inferred, to tax all
available long-distance services. 26 If so, a literal reading of the stat-
19 There exist numerous examples in the Code where the distinction between "and" and
"or" is critical. For example, section 708(b)(2)(A) provides that if two partnerships merge, the
resulting partnership is a continuation of the partnership whose members own an interest of
more than 50% in capital and profits of the resulting partnership. Needless to say, restating this
condition to require a greater-than-50% interest in capital or profits (thus leaving open the
possibility that the members of one partnership have a majority interest in capital while mem-
bers of the other have a majority interest in profits) would significantly complicate things.
Compare this to section 706(b)(3), which defines a "principal partner" for purposes of determin-
ing a partner's or a partnership's taxable year as a partner having an interest of five percent or
more in partnership profits or capital. See I.R.C. §§ 706(b)(3), 708(b)(2)(A) (2004).
20 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
21 Id. at 1364-65 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 80 (1966)).
22 Id. at 1365. The court also found it important that the word "and" connected subsec-
tions 4252(b)(1) and (b)(2) (each of which describes a communication that can be a "toll tele-
phone service" under the statute, and, importantly, either of which is taxable). Additionally, it
noted the use of "and" to connect three separate definitions in section 4251(b), which defines
various kinds of communications, any one of which may be a "communication service" under
section 425 1(a). Id.
23 Id. at 1363-64.
24 Id. at 1367.
2 Id.
26 Id.
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ute, by allowing certain long-distance services to escape taxation,
would have defeated the statute's apparent purpose of taxing all such
services.27
Having concluded that both ambiguity in the statute's language
and evidence of a contrary legislative intent justified looking beyond
the statute's plain meaning, the court next sought to clarify what
Congress's intent might have been. In sum, the court again found that
the statute was intended to tax all commercial long-distance services;
thus, time and distance were not both required in order to have a tax-
able "toll telephone service" under section 4251 (b)(1).
Support for this conclusion came from familiar sources: to the
court, the 1965 amendment's description of all billing methods avail-
able at the time and the fact that reading "and" as "or" would further
the purported purpose of taxing all commercial long-distance calls
both evidenced Congress's aims.28 Further, the legislative history of
the 1965 amendment added support to the notion that Congress in-
tended a broad scope for the statute. By the court's reasoning, be-
cause the legislative history did not explicitly indicate that there was
to be a change in the type of services taxed, the statute's broad scope
was unaffected by the amendment. Thus, services such as those pur-
chased by the plaintiff that would have been taxable before the
change would continue to be taxable after the change.29
The court also found support for its view that distance is not a nec-
essary component of a "toll telephone service" under section
4252(b)(1) in a 1979 revenue ruling cited by the government in sup-
port of its argument. The court found that only the deference due the
ruling was at issue, although it failed to note the debatable validity of
the government's citing its own pronouncement as "authority." Spe-
cifically, Revenue Ruling 79-404 addressed whether communications
between seafaring ships and the shore charged at a single, distance-
independent rate were taxable under section 4251 .30 The IRS con-
ceded in the ruling that the communications did not literally fall
within 4252(b)(1)'s definition. However, it took a stance similar to
27 Id. at 1368.
28 Id. at 1369.
29 Id. at 1369-70. As discussed infra, under the pre-1965 statute, a toll telephone service
was a telephonic communication for which there was a toll charge that was paid within the U.S.;
the 1965 amendment changed the definition to its present-day form. The legislative history
behind the change, however, states that the reason for the alteration was only to make sure that
long-distance services, and not simply the equipment used for such services, were to be taxed.
See H.R. REP. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676-77. Nevertheless, the
court found Congress's silence on the type of services to be taxed to be an indication that no
substantive change in the provision's scope was intended.
30 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
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that of the court in concluding that the statute's purpose would be
frustrated by not taxing services within the scope of the statute's in-
tent but nevertheless outside of its literal language.3' Conceding that
the ruling was not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking or simi-
lar formal processes and thus had neither the force nor effect of a
regulation, the court found the ruling entitled to as much force as its
persuasiveness allowed.32
The court determined that the ruling was persuasive, noting that it
had been frequently applied in the years since its issuance. Further, a
treasury regulation proposed in 2003 adopted the interpretation, and if
the regulation were adopted it would give the underlying logic inher-
ently more weight.33 With this in mind, the court thus gave the ruling
substantial deference, noting that it "expresses a longstanding IRS
interpretation of § 4252(b)(1), it is entirely reasonable, and it is con-
sistent with the intent of Congress to tax commercial long-distance
telephone services."
34
Thus, considering section 4252(b)(1)'s ambiguity and Congress's
apparent intent, the court had essentially expanded the statute's reach
in holding that the long-distance services the plaintiff had purchased
fell within the definition of a taxable "toll telephone service."
B. Office Max, Inc. v. United States: Modern Long-Distance Ser-
vices are Not Taxable
Soon after American Bankers Insurance Group, in Office Max,
Inc. v. United States, the district court for the Northern District of
Ohio considered facts identical to those in American Bankers Insur-
ance Group but reached a markedly different conclusion. The tax-
payer in Office Max sought a refund of over $380,000 for taxes paid
on four years' worth of long-distance service.35 In support of its case,
Office Max used a familiar argument, claiming that because distance
was not a factor in how it was billed for long-distance services, it did
not receive a "toll telephone service" taxable under section
31 Id. Specifically, the ruling noted that "the intent of the statute would be frustrated if a
new type of service otherwise within such intent were held to be nontaxable merely because
charges for it are determined in a manner which is not within the literal language of the statute."
Id.
32 Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
33 Id. at 1372. The Office Max court, discussed infra, also noted the existence of this pro-
posed regulation but seemingly dismissed its significance due to its status as a merely proposed
regulation. As such, discussion of the proposed regulation was relegated to a footnote. See
Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 997 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
- Am. Bankers Ins. Group, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
35 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
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4252(b)(1).36  Once again, the key issue was whether the long-
distance service purchased by the plaintiff constituted a "toll tele-
phone service" under the statute; more specifically, the question was
whether the absence of distance as a factor in how the taxpayer was
billed placed the long-distance service received outside section
4252(b)(1)'s grasp.
Like its counterpart in American Bankers Insurance Group, the
court in Office Max first tackled the issue of section 4252's purported
ambiguity, noting the common rule of statutory construction that
where a statute's language is clear, a court's sole function is to en-
force the statute according to its terms.37 Unlike its predecessor,
however, the court found the language of section 4252(b)(1) "clear
and unambiguous" and thus not providing justification for an excur-
sion beyond the statute's plain meaning.
38
Even so, each party argued for a different interpretation of the
statute's plain language. Office Max argued that variation in both
distance and time were required to make long-distance service a "toll
telephone service," while the government advocated a less literal
reading that would have allowed the long-distance services purchased
by the plaintiff to be taxable.39 The court found the plaintiffs inter-
pretation the better one, noting the presumption that every word in a
statute served a purpose and that Congress had expressly and care-
fully chosen to define "toll telephone service" in terms of variation in
both distance and time.n° As such, the plain language of the statute
was unambiguous and thus enforceable by its terms.
The Office Max court next addressed the American Bankers Insur-
ance Group court's conclusion that the statute was ambiguous, adding
that it "respectfully disagree[d]" with the holding.4' Quite simply, the
36 Id.
37 Id. at 992 (quoting Chapman v. The Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 829 (6th Cir. 2003)).
38 Id. at 993. The court also noted the time-honored notion that "statutes imposing a tax
are construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer." Id.
39 Id. Specifically, the government argued that the statute required only that calculation of
a charge include a "distance toll rate" in order to satisfy the distance component of the statute.
As such, neither the distance of an individual call nor the distance toll rate applied to the call
need vary with each communication. Instead, only the product of the distance toll rate times the
elapsed transmission time need vary in order to meet the statute's requirements. As the charges
for the services purchased by the plaintiff varied with elapsed transmission time, the service at
issue was thus a taxable "toll telephone service" according to the government. The government
acknowledged that this construction would require neither a variation in the distance of the call
itself or even in the toll rate applied to the call in order for it to be a "toll telephone service."
This, the court noted, effectively read the requirement of variation by distance out of the statute.
Finally, in addition to rejecting the government's view, the court pointed out its inconsistency
with Revenue Ruling 79-404, on which the government relied heavily and which is discussed
both supra and infra. Id. at 993-94.
40 Id. (quoting Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003)).
41 Id. at 995.
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Office Max court felt that "the use of the word 'and' in [section
4252(b)'s] 'distance and elapsed transmission time' [requirement] can
[not] be read other than in the conjunctive. ''42 Because both distance
and time were factors in calculating long distance charges at the time
of the statute's 1965 amendment, it was only logical that Congress
meant for "and" to be read conjunctively and thus require variations
of both distance and time.43  Further, even though the modem-day
Congress may wish to tax all long-distance services whether or not
they fall within the statute's language, the court found that the rele-
vant inquiry was what Congress intended when it amended the statute
in 1965.44 Taking all of this into consideration, the court found that
the statute was not ambiguous and thus that the statute's requirement
that charges vary with both distance and time "should be given full
effect.
4 5
Because the statute was unambiguous, the court did not feel that it
was compelled to further investigate legislative intent nor was such
investigation even appropriate.46 Nonetheless, the court addressed the
government's argument and determined that it would have reached
the same conclusion even if evidence of congressional intent were
taken into account.
As before, the government attempted to bolster its case with Reve-
nue Ruling 79-404, claiming that the ruling evidenced a broad in-
tended scope for section 4252(b)(1). Once again, the determinative
issue was the level of deference due the ruling, and again the Office
Max court reached a conclusion different from the American Bankers
Insurance Group court. The Office Max court began by finding that a
revenue ruling is entitled to some deference unless it conflicts with
the statute it allegedly interprets, conflicts with the statute's legisla-
tive history, or is otherwise unreasonable,47 and noted that revenue
rulings lack the force and effect of regulations. 48 Instead, the defer-
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 995. This, of course, was to tax the two then-existing types of long-distance ser-
vice billing.
45 Id. The government argued in the alternative that the fact that the fees paid by the
plaintiff varied depending on whether calls were placed interstate, intrastate or international
meant that distance was a factor in computing charges. The plaintiff naturally disagreed, point-
ing out that a call from Cleveland, Ohio, to any location inside the U.S. (outside of Ohio) would
be billed at the same rate regardless of the distance of the actual communication. Again, the
court found the plaintiff's view persuasive. Id. at 995-96.
46 Id. at n.14.
47 Id. at 997 (citing Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 173 (6th Cir.
2003)). The Aeroquip-Vickers court noted recent Supreme Court cases limiting the deference
given to issuances created by delegation of power by Congress to an agency. Aeroquip-Vickers,
347 F.3d at 180.
48 Id. at 997-98 (citing Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 181).
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ence afforded the ruling would depend on its "power to persuade," or,
in other words, "the validity and thoroughness of its reasoning and its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements. ' 49 Because the
logic behind the ruling was not reasonable, the court found it entitled
to no deference.5 °
The court's justification for this conclusion was multi-faceted.
First, the revenue ruling relied on the statutes' legislative history (es-
pecially that behind the 1965 amendment) to reach its conclusion that
no substantive change was intended for the statutes. The legislative
history, however, did not in fact support this result. Because the taxes
at issue were enacted as emergency war-time measures and were not
developed on any systematic basis, Congress had, at the time of the
1965 amendment, concluded that their application caused undesirable
discrimination.51 The amendment was intended to remedy this dis-
crimination by, among other things, updating and modifying the defi-
nition of "toll telephone service" in section 4252(b)( 1).52
As noted by the court, the statute previously had included as "toll
telephone services" any "telephone or radio telephone message or
conversation for which (1) there [was] a toll charge, and (2) the
charge [was] paid within the United States"; the amendment changed
the definition to its current form.53 The only existing explanation for
the definitional change comes from the legislative history to the
amendment, and this suggests merely that the change was intended to
clarify that the tax was to be imposed on services and not equipment
while also reiterating the definition of "toll telephone service., 54 In
Revenue Ruling 79-404, the IRS had interpreted this history to mean
that Congress generally intended no change in the types of services
taxed. As such, the IRS found that congressional intent would be
frustrated by exempting a service from taxation simply because it fell
outside the literal language of the statute.
56
Nevertheless, the Office Max court did not interpret the brevity of
the amendment's legislative history to mean that no substantive
change was intended. Rather, such a conclusion was "belied by the
49 Id. at 998.
50 Id. at 999.
51 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645).
52 Id.
53 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 4252(b), as enacted by P.L. 85-859).
-4 H.R. Rep. No. 89-433 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1676-77. As dis-
cussed supra, The American Bankers Insurance Group court found that the brevity of this
history signified that the statute was to continue to tax all long-distance service.
55 The ruling did note that Congress intended to exempt certain private communications
services from tax, but they were inapposite to the issue at hand. See Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2
C.B. 382.
56 Id.
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fact that Congress expressly chose to alter the formerly broad statu-
tory language [of section 4252(b)(1)] to include the requirements that
the [long-distance] charge vary by both distance and time.",57 Further,
the language of the legislative history was "identical in all material
respect[s] to the plain language of the statute itself., 58 The court felt
it necessary to presume that Congress "meant what it said" when it
altered the statute, especially considering that the overall goal of the
Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 (which contained the modification
to section 4252(b)(1)) was to reduce and restrict the application of
federal excise taxes.59
Further, the court found inadequate support for one of the ruling's
key contentions - the conclusion that a statute may be given an in-
terpretation other than that given by its literal language.60 According
to the court, the case law on which the ruling relied to support this
proposition was inappropriately used by the IRS.61 Instead, the Office
Max court found the Supreme Court case of Crooks v. Harrelson62
more applicable to the situation, noting the case's proposition that "to
justify a departure from the letter of the law [because of an absurd
result], the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral
or common sense." 63 Further, "[ilt is not enough merely that hard and
objectionable or absurd consequences, which probably were not
within the contemplation of the framers, are produced by an act of
57 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
58 The court noted:
Revenue Ruling 79-404's conclusion that Congress intended only to exempt certain
private communication services and repeal the tax on telegraph and wire/equipment
service but that "there is no indication that Congress otherwise intended to make
changes in the types of service subject to tax," is belied by the fact that Congress ex-
pressly chose to alter the formerly broad statutory language to include the require-
ments that the charge vary by both distance and time. Defendant's argument that this
Court should nevertheless interpret the current definition of "toll telephone service"
to include charges that do not vary with distance would render Congress' modifica-
tion of this definition meaningless.
Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
59 Id.
60 Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382.
61 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. For various reasons, cases on which the rul-
ing relied, United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940) and Corn Prod. Refin-
ing Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), failed to provide the support necessary to reach the
ruling's conclusion. Id. at 1001-02.
62 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
63 Office Max, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (quoting Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60). The Office
Max court also noted that case's commentary that "[c]ourts have sometimes exercised a high
degree of ingenuity in the effort to find justification for wrenching from the words of a statute a
meaning which literally they did not bear in order to escape consequences thought to be absurd
or to entail great hardship." Id. (quoting Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60). Whether intentionally or not,
the court did not refer to the American Bankers Insurance Group court in citing this quotation.
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legislation.... [T]he remedy lies with the lawmaking authority, and
not with the courts." 64
Summing up its rejection of the ruling's reasoning, the court found
that "there is nothing in the context or in other provisions of § 4252
which warrants the conclusion that the word 'and' was used otherwise
than in its ordinary sense," and the ruling did not provide a persuasive
reason to depart from the language of the statute.65 As a result, the
court found that "Revenue Ruling 79-404 does not possess the 'power
to persuade' as required ... and, thus, is entitled to no deference. 66
Finally, the court considered the fact that section 4251 had been
reenacted and amended to extend the expiration of its tax in the time
after the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 79-404. Specifically, the
question was whether reenactment was indicative of congressional
intent to adopt the ruling's position. The government argued that the
fact that these occurrences happened during and after the time that
distance was phased out as a factor in computing long-distance
charges suggested that Congress could have changed the statute if
there was any possibility that the new pricing plans exempted any
long-distance services from the tax.67 The court skeptically noted the
importance of determining whether the ruling had actually been
brought to Congress's attention; otherwise, it would hardly be a reli-
able indicator of Congress's objectives.68 There was no indication
that Congress had been made aware of the ruling, however, and there
was no mention of it in the legislative history to subsequent amend-
ments to sections 4251 and 4252.69 As a result, Congress could not
be assumed to have implicitly adopted the ruling's logic by reenacting
the provisions after its release.
Having dismissed Revenue Ruling 79-404, the court thus found
that the long-distance services the plaintiff had purchased were not
"toll telephone services" under 4252(b)(1) even when taking into ac-
count extrinsic evidence of congressional intent.
C. Other Cases Addressing Sections 4251 and 4252
Since American Bankers Insurance Group and Office Max, a few
more cases have tackled the issue of whether modem billing methods
64 Id. (quoting Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60).
65 Id.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 1003-04.
68 Id. at 1004.
69 Id. The government also cited United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
U.S. 200 (2001), in support of its argument, but the court found the case distinguishable. Id. at
1005.
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constitute "toll telephone services" under section 4252(b)(1). Each
sided with the Office Max court by rejecting the idea that section
4252(b)(1) is somehow ambiguous. Among these cases were Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. United States7° and Fortis, Inc. v.
United States,7' tried in the district courts for the District of Columbia
and the Southern District of New York, respectively. Each court
found the plain meaning of section 4252(b)(1) sufficiently clear to
hold for the plaintiff taxpayers. As with the original cases, the quan-
tity of money at issue was significant, involving refunds for approxi-
mately $86,000 for three months' taxes 72 and $392,000 for three and
one-half years' taxes.73 These are not the.only cases to consider the
issue, however - numerous others are pending around the country.74
III. CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code is not immune to technological
change, and sections 4251 and 4252 provide ample proof of this.
Because the provision of long-distance services has moved beyond
methods encompassed by the original statutes, large sums have been
placed beyond the reach of the statutes' literal language.75 This
leaves the application of the outdated provisions to the courts, creat-
ing the potential for unfair application such as in American Bankers
Insurance Group. Likewise, just as more and more businesses will
note the opportunity created by the Code's language, modem tech-
nologies such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) will continue to
push the notion of what constitutes a "toll telephone service" further
away from the vision of the statutes' drafters. Those providers that
remain may, after further judicial developments, even stop collecting
the taxes from their customers.76
70 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2004).
7' Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16.2004).
72 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 338 F. Supp.2d at 24.
73 Foris, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18686, at *5.
74 See Rojas, supra note 3, at 413 (giving a detailed summary of both pending and decided
actions).
75 As discussed, the language itself is quite clear, and others seem to agree. See id. at 415
("According to [one tax lawyer], the plain language stance taken by the Supreme Court in Gitlitz
v. Commissioner ensures that modem courts will continue to shoot holes in the IRS's congres-
sional-intent argument.") (citation omitted).
76 See id. (citing a telecom industry source who suggested that, once an appellate court
upholds one of the decisions finding for th6 taxpayer, some service providers may cease collect-
ing the taxes in the first place).
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The Internal Revenue Service has already made its position clear. 7
Whether Congress feels that these war-time provisions are still an
appropriate source of tax revenue, however, is uncertain. As long as
section 4252(b)(1) exists in its current form, a few courts will stretch
the boundaries of logic to apply the provision to hapless taxpayers.
Obviously, this is undesirable, although as Andrew Jackson observed,
man has yet to devise the ideal tax system. This does not, however,
excuse society from trying.
KURT A. LEEPER t
77 In addition to the position the Service has taken in litigation, late in the summer of 2004
it released a notice reiterating its position that it will continue to tax services as long as either
one of section 4252(b)(1)'s distance or time requirements is satisfied. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-
57, 2004-35 I.R.B. 376.
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